











                                             UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
                                                       FACULTY OF LAW 
                                        COMMERCIAL LAW DEPARTMENT 
 
PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN TERMS OF GORE: SECTION 20(9) OF 
THE NEW COMPANIES ACT 17 OF 2008 
                                                                      BY: 
                                        WASHINGTON TAWANDA ZINDOGA 
                                                                ZNDWAS001 
 
RESEARCH DISSERTATION PRESENTED FOR THE APPROVAL OF SENATE IN 
FULFILMENT OF PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LLM COMMERCIAL 
LAW DEGREE IN APPROVED COURSES AND A MINOR DISSERTATION. THE 
OTHER PART OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THIS QUALIFICATION WAS THE 
COMPLETION OF A PROGRAMME OF COURSES. 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SUBMISSION OF LLM COMMERCIAL LAW 
DISSERTATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE RELATING TO LENGTH AND PLAGIARISM, 
AS CONTAINED IN THE RULES OF THIS UNIVERSITY, AND THAT THIS 
DISSERTATION CONFORMS TO THOSE REGULATIONS. 
 
SUPERVISOR:  MR RICHARD BRADSTREET 
DATE:   28 SEPTEMBER 2015 














The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 








































My sincere thanks and praise to the Lord Almighty, through whom all things are possible. I would 
not have been able to accomplish this task on my own. Thank you Lord for the grace, wisdom, 
strength and ability. I wish to express my gratitude and sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Mr 
Richard Bradstreet for his invaluable guidance, insight comments, thoroughness and advice in the 
writing of this dissertation. Without his unwavering support, this work would not have been 
completed. 
I would like to extend my greatest appreciation to my parents, Godfrey and Anna for their 
tremendous encouragement, unwavering support and being prize parents, without whom I could 
not have been where I am. Also, to my lovely fiancée, Gillian Mapwashike, whose affection, love, 
encouragement and prayers of day and night make me able to get such success and motivation to 
complete this dissertation. Looking forward to our lifelong journey. 
My brothers and sisters, Walter, Pride, Faith, Baba George and Elizabeth, thank you so much for 
your prayers, moral support and encouragement throughout the year. Lastly, I would like to thank 
MasterCard Foundation for the sponsorship and assistance during my studies for an LLM in 














TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………....…………………4 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..…6 
1.2 Academic and practical reasons for choosing the subject.......................................6 
1.3 Outline of Research………………………………………………………………….8 
Chapter 2: Piercing of the corporate veil –Common law 
  2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………..……………….10 
2.2 The Concept of Separate Legal Personality………………………………….…...10 
2.3 Emergence of the Concept of Veil Piercing…………………………………….…12 
 2.3.1 What is ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil’……………………………….....12 
 2.3.2 A Brief History of the Corporate Veil…………………………………..14 
2.4 Piercing of the Corporate Veil in South Africa………………………………...…16 
2.5 Piercing of the Corporate Veil in England………………………………………..19 
 2.5.1 The New Approach in Prest..………..…………………………………...24 
2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..25 
Chapter 3: Interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act: Ex Parte Gore 
  3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………...27 
  3.2 Theories of Statutory Interpretation in South Africa……………….…………...28 
  3.3 The New Constitutional Dispensation: A Purposive Approach…………………31 
  3.4 Guidelines on applying the purposive approach to interpreting legislation……36 
  3.5 Mandate to promote values of the Constitution in the Companies Act…………37 
  3.6 Analysis of the Ex Parte Gore judgment………………...………………………..37 
   3.6.1 Facts of the case…………………………………………………………..38 
   3.6.2 The court’s findings……………………………………………………...38 
   3.6.3 The court’s interpretation of section 20(9)……………………………..40 
5 
 
    3.6.3.1 ‘Interested person’ under section 20(9)……………………...40 
    3.6.3.2 ‘Unconscionable abuse’……………………………………….42 
    3.6.3.3 Remedy of last resort: section 20(9)……………………….…45 
    3.6.3.4 Does section 20(9) override the common law? .......................47 
  3.7 Conclusion………………………………………………………….……………..…49 























1.2 Academic and practical reasons for choosing the subject 
For many years, jurists have struggled to rationalise the common law rules which regulate the 
circumstances in which it is justifiable to override the principle of separate legal personality.1 
According to the principle of separate legal personality, which represents the division between the 
existence of the legal entity and that of its owners, the obligations of the corporation are not 
imputed to the owner or shareholders of the corporation. In order to address legal challenges 
associated with the principle, for example, abuse of separate legal personality by the shareholders 
or directors of an entity, the courts have come up with the doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’, 
which allows a court to disregard the separate legal personality of the corporate entity and thereby 
hold such corporation’s shareholders and directors personally liable for the obligations of the 
corporation under certain circumstances.2 
As the court in Amlin v Van Kooij observed, ‘piercing the veil necessitates that a court looks 
beyond the corporate entity and to its owners or shareholders in order to see for itself what obtained 
inside.’3 However, the position has not yet been reached in our law where it is possible to state 
with any degree of accuracy the circumstance in which the courts will pierce the veil under the 
common law.4 The courts have grappled with the correct approach to adopt in determining whether 
or not to pierce the corporate veil. The concept of veil piercing has been criticised as by some, as 
being vague, uncertain and unpredictable.5 In the classic words of Cardoso J in Berkey v Third 
Avenue, the concept is ‘enveloped in the mists of metaphor’.6 The courts seem to give different 
general formulations as to when the corporate veil will be pierced in terms of the common law 
principles. In a similar vein, the court in R Polly Peck International stated that piercing the veil ‘is 
a vivid but imprecise metaphor’.7 
                                                          
1D Cabrelli ‘The Case Against ‘Outsider Reverse’ Veil Piercing in UK Company Law’ (2010) 10 JCLS 343. 
2 AB Sachs & LC Hodge ‘Piercing the mist: Bring the Thompson study into the 1990s’ (2008) 43 WFLR 341. 
3 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) at 12. 
4 R Cassim Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 45.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Berkey v Third Avenue Co 244 NY 84 (1926) at 94. 
7 R Polly Peck International plp [1996] 2 All ER 433 at 447. 
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Whilst the common law cases demonstrate that the courts are far from enthusiastic about piercing 
the corporate veil to enable creditors or other third parties to obtain a remedy, it is not 
impregnable.8 Nevertheless, the doctrine, as a means of determining when to pierce the veil, has 
been subjected routinely to criticism. 
Whereas the remedy of ‘piercing of the corporate veil’ previously only existed in the common law, 
it has now been expressly incorporated into legislation under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(hereinafter ‘the Companies Act’). Section 20(9) of the Companies Act, has introduced a statutory 
basis for piercing the corporate veil of companies.9 The advantage of having a statutory provision 
that provides for the piercing of the corporate veil is that it provides the courts with useful 
guidelines as to when to pierce the corporate veil.10 Some regard section 20(9) as an alternative to 
broaden the grounds upon which a court might disregard the separate legal personality of an entity 
when there has been ‘unconscionable abuse’.11 
While this provision is to be welcomed, it does raise many questions and uncertainties surrounding 
its application and interpretation.12 Roodt regards this as a curious provision, in that it is not at all 
clear what purpose it is intended to serve.13 For instance, the section fails to define the term 
‘unconscionable abuse’, to provide any guidance on the circumstances that constitute an 
‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity and there is 
no clear indication where this term comes from.14 It is also not clear from a reading of the section 
whether section 20(9) overrides the common law or the judicial instances of piercing the corporate 
veil, or whether piercing of the veil must still be regarded as an exceptional remedy to be used 
only as a last resort, as is the case at common law.15 Moreover, section 20(9) does not provide 
                                                          
8 Cabrelli op cit (n1) 344. 
9 Ex Parte: Gore NO 2013 (2) All SA 437 at 144. 
10 Cassim op cit (n4) 42. 
11 Ibid. 
12 R Cassim ‘Piercing the veil under section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: A New Direction’ (2014) 26 SA 
MERCLJ 307. 
13 J Roodt ‘The Companies Act of 2008 - the consequences of the “unconscionable abuse” of the company's juristic 
personality’ 15 May 2015, available at http://www.roodtinc.com/newsletter, accessed on 12 April 2015. 




guidance in regard to who would constitute an ‘interested person’ within the scope and ambit of 
the section.16 
Therefore, some questions of interpretation do arise: Can section 20(9) be seen as a replacement 
of the common law rule? Can the rule of veil piercing still be seen as a rule of last resort? What is 
meant by the terms ‘unconscionable abuse’ and ‘interested persons’ as it is not clear from the 
provision itself? 
The first judgment on the interpretation of this important provision was handed down in the case 
of Ex Parte Gore [2013] 2 All SA 437 (WCC). The court had to decide on whether to ignore the 
separate legal personalities involved and, ‘pierce the corporate veil’, of certain subsidiary 
companies to attach liability to the holding company in terms of the common law or alternatively 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act.  
A key question to be addressed by this dissertation is whether the court in Gore, in the course of 
its judgment answered some of the questions set out above, and set out some important principles 
in regard to the interpretation and application of section 20(9) of the Companies Act in light of 
accepted legal maxims and cannons of statutory interpretation.  It is against this background that 
the statutory approach in piercing of the corporate veil must be examined. In view of the above the 
research seeks to demonstrate how the lack of a single, coherent principle has brought an element 
of inconsistency and uncertainty into the law and attempts to clarify this uncertainty. 
1.3 Outline of Research 
The first part of this minor dissertation will examine the historical development of the common 
law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, its status and the concerns raised against the rule. In 
light of the fact that veil piercing erodes the limited liability of a company, it is necessary to 
appreciate both the relevance and the significance of separate legal personality and the historical 
development of the doctrine that carves out exceptions to limited liability in this context. The 
concept of separate legal personality goes hand in hand with the doctrine of veil piercing.  
 
This part will further illustrate the various approaches that courts have taken in deciding whether 
or not to pierce the corporate veil. A criticism of the doctrine is that it comes with no clear 




guidelines directing courts to the appropriate circumstances for piercing the corporate veil. It will 
be argued that the courts have relied invariably on a number of discrete, unrelated categories of 
conduct upon which to base decisions to disregard the corporate personality of a company, but this 
approach in the end is unsatisfactory. The concept of corporate personality will be discussed in 
this part in order to achieve a better understanding of the concept itself and to shed some light on 
the legal nature of the corporate personality. 
Furthermore, this part will examine recent trends in foreign law in regard to the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil that may serve as guidelines to the interpretation and the application of the 
doctrine in South African law. Particularly, the English judicial approach to piercing the corporate 
veil will be discussed. This in turn will lead to a consideration of the question whether further 
development is necessary, and if so, which direction is best suited for South African company law. 
The second part of this dissertation will discuss the rules of interpretation, the basic approaches to 
statutory interpretation followed by our courts and which approach has enjoyed preference in 
recent judgments.  These approaches will assist in the discussion on the interpretation of section 
20(9) of the Companies Act. Section 20(9) will be examined, and the concerns that writers have 
raised will be discussed. This part will further examine the judgment delivered in Gore with 
specific reference to the theories of statutory interpretation used, and the final interpretation 
applied by the court and what effect this has on the existing rules of piercing the corporate veil. It 
will be contended that courts must interpret and apply section 20(9) in a way that gives effect to 
the purport and spirit of the Constitution and results in clarity and simplicity in the statutory 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. 
The fourth and final part of this research will summarize the discussion, where the research will 
be considered and recommendations made as to how section 20(9) should be best interpreted. 
Given the lack of a unified approach to the scope and conditions of application of the doctrine of 
veil piercing, which allegedly leads to confusion and frequent misuse, this study aims at clarifying 
the scope of the doctrine and conditions under which it can be applied. It will attempt to clear up 





CHAPTER 2  Piercing of the Corporate Veil: Common Law  
2.1 Introduction 
As was previously discussed, the question of when the courts should ‘pierce the corporate veil’ 
and disregard a company’s separate legal personality has been a frequent source of debate, both at 
a national and at an international level, among academics and legal practitioners. The courts in 
South Africa, England and Canada alike failed to formulate a single, coherent principle upon which 
to base decisions to disregard the separate juristic personality of a company.17 Instead, judges have 
invariably relied on one or other of a number of discrete, unrelated categories of conduct in order 
to justify such decisions.18 Although there have been several attempts, the search for a universally 
accepted test for veil piercing decisions has so far proved difficult.  
Therefore, this chapter will first consider the concept of separate legal personality in order to 
achieve a better understanding of this doctrine, and application of the veil piercing doctrine in 
South Africa. Furthermore, the chapter will comparatively provide and analyse the framework of 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine from the perspective of United Kingdom. The purpose of this 
comparative analysis is to thoroughly report any similarities or difference in the manner in which 
the courts in this jurisdiction have dealt with this issue. It is also important to note that this 
comparative analysis is an attempt to find a practical solution to this problem. This in turn will 
lead to a consideration of the question whether further development is necessary, and if so, which 
direction is best suited for South African company law. 
2.2  The Concept of Separate Legal Personality 
At the foundation of company law is the concept that a company has a separate legal personality.  
One of the legal consequences of separate legal personality is that a company acquires the capacity 
to have its own rights and obligations separate from that of its directors and shareholders.19  This 
means that corporate obligations vest in the company and not the shareholders, nor directors of 
such entity. Thus, a metaphorical veil is created between the shareholders, directors and the 
company which protects shareholders from the liabilities and debts of the company. In Airport 
                                                          
17 LC Davids ‘The lingering question: Some perspective on the lifting of the corporate veil’ (1994) TSAR 155. 
18 A Domanski ‘Piercing of the Corporate Veil: A New Direction’ (1986) SALJ 224. 
19 Cassim op cit (n4) 31. 
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Cold Storage v Ebrahim, the court confirmed that one of the most fundamental consequences of 
incorporation is that a company is a juristic entity separate from its members.20  This fundamental 
principle of company law was first laid down in unequivocal terms by the House of Lords in the 
leading case of Salomon v Salomon, commonly referred to as the Salomon case.21 This case is a 
foundational case for the doctrine of corporate personality and illustrates how seriously the courts 
take the idea of separate legal personality. 
This case concerned a common business manoeuvre whereby Aron Salomon, the owner of a boot 
and leather business sold it to a company he formed, in return for fully paid-up shares in it, allotted 
to him and members of his family. Salomon also received an acknowledgement of the company’s 
indebtedness to him, in the form of secured debentures. These were later mortgaged to an outsider. 
Soon after formation, the company went under liquidation at the behest of unpaid trade creditors. 
The debentures, being secured by a charge on the company’s assets ranked in priority to the trade 
creditors and so the mortgage to the outsider was paid off. About £1,000 remained and Aron 
Salomon, was now unencumbered owner of the debentures, claimed this is priority to the trade 
creditors. He succeeded and also defeated the claims that he should be made to indemnify the 
company in respect of its debts. On appeal the House of Lords held: 
‘…the company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum and that 
though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before incorporation, 
and the same persons are managers, and the same hands received the profits, the company is not in law the 
agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, 
except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act. Any member of a company acting in good faith 
is much entitled to take and hold the company’s debentures as any outside creditors’.22 
The quoted passage vividly demonstrates that trading in the form of a company with its own legal 
personality is legally permissible.23  The effect of the Lords unanimous ruling was to firmly uphold 
the doctrine of corporate personality. In addition, this implies that the company would be 
recognised as a legal person separate from its shareholder and directors. In our jurisprudence the 
concept of separate legal personality of a company is soundly affirmed in section 19(1) (b) of the 
                                                          
20 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim 2008 (2) SA 303 (C) at 17. 
21 Salomon v Salomon Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
22 Salomon v Salomon supra (n21) at 50. 
23 LV Mthembu To lift or not to lift the corporate veil-unfinished story: A critical analysis of common law principles 
in lifting the corporate veil LLM (Natal) (2002) 16. 
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Companies Act, which states that, ‘from the date and time that the incorporation of a company is 
registered, the company has all the legal powers and capacity of an individual’.24  
Nevertheless, this concept of separate legal personality and the benefits it produces may be subject 
to abuse as courts have acknowledged.25  Consequently the courts have, on occasions, refused to 
recognise the existence of a separate personality of the corporate entity and disregard the veil of 
incorporation in order to examine who really controls the corporation. This process is usually 
described as ‘piercing the corporate veil’. Courts have created this equitable doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil to allow corporate creditors to hold owners and shareholders personally liable 
for corporate obligations and liabilities under limited circumstances.26  It must be stressed that 
such cases are exceptional and rare. The approach our courts have followed to date and the 
concerns raised around piercing the corporate veil will be discussed in depth below. 
2.3  Emergence of the concept of veil piercing 
2.3.1  What is ‘Piercing the corporate veil’? 
When the corporate veil is pierced the focus shifts from the company to the natural person or 
persons behind it or in control of its activities as if there is no difference between the company and 
such person or such persons. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been the primary 
method through which the courts have mitigated the strenuous demands of the logical fulfilment 
of the separate legal existence of a juristic entity.27 Simply put, piercing the corporate veil permit 
courts, in appropriate circumstances, to ignore the separate existence of an artificial legal person.28 
In Amlin v Van Kooij, the court defined piercing the corporate veil as ‘a mechanism to determine 
who the controllers behind the company are and attribute the company’s liabilities to them 
accordingly’.29 In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubber Controlling Investments, it was held that piercing of  
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 D Van Huyssteen Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Critical Analysis of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
LLM (Johannesburg) (2014) 17. 
26 LC Hodge & AB Sachs ‘Empirical Study: Piercing the Veil: Bringing the Thompson Study into the 1990s’ (2008) 43 
Wake Forest Law Review 341 at 344. 
27 AG Forji ‘The Veil Doctrine in Company Law’, 28 September 2015, available at 
http://www.llrx.com/features/veildoctrine.htm, accessed on 24 May 2015. 
28 S Farzana ‘The Concept of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Corporate Law: A Critical Analysis’ (2009) 14 The 
Chittagong University Journal of Law 129 at 135. 
29 Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) at 22. 
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the corporate veil means ‘disregarding the dichotomy between a company and the natural person 
behind it or in control of its activities and attributing liability to that person where he has misused 
or abused the principle of corporate personality’.30 It seems logical to say that piercing of the 
corporate veil refers to the judicially imposed exception to the separate legal entity principle, 
whereby courts disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold shareholders or directors 
responsible for the actions of the corporation as if it were the actions of the shareholder. 
Before delving further into this topic one must, in order to avoid any confusion, distinguish 
between the concepts of piercing the veil and lifting the veil.31 Courts sometimes refer to the phrase 
piercing the veil when the effects is to lift the veil, and conversely. Piercing the veil and lifting the 
veil are in fact distinct and different legal terms with different legal consequences.32 Therefore, the 
concepts must not be used interchangeably. The distinction is drawn in a number of cases and is 
now well known. Staughton LJ offered the following basis for a distinction in Atlas Maritime v 
Arolon Maritime: 
‘To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for treating the rights or liabilities or 
activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders. To lift the corporate or look 
behind it, on the other hand, should mean to have regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal 
purpose’.33 
In Pioneer Concrete Service v Yelnah, Young J described ‘lifting the corporate veil’ as meaning 
‘that although whenever each individual company is formed a separate legal personality is created, 
courts will on occasions look behind the legal personality to the real controllers’.34 It is noteworthy 
that this does not necessarily entail ignoring the separate identity of the company but looking at 
who the members or directors of the company are.35 This was illustrated in the case of Daimler 
Company v Continental Tyre.36 The Daimler case did not entail piercing the veil since the court 
did not ignore the legal personality of the company in question, but rather simply taking into 
account the identity of its shareholders and directors in order to decide whether the company was 
                                                          
30 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubber Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 790 (A) at 28 (hereinafter Cape Pacific). 
31 F Cassim The Practitioner’s Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 1ed (2011) 22. 
32 Cassim op cit (n12) at 22. 
33 Atlas Maritime Co SA v Arolon Maritime Ltd 1991 (4) SA 769 (CA) at 779. 
34 Pioneer Concrete Service v Yelnah (1986) 5 NSWLR at 254. 
35 Cassim op cit (n12) 22. 
36 Daimler Company Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd 1916 2 AC 307 at 264. 
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an enemy company.37 It simply took into account the identity of its shareholders and directors in 
order to decide whether the company was an enemy company and lifting the veil.38 In any event, 
this dissertation will be concerned with the application of the doctrine that has the effect of 
disregarding the separate legal existence of a company entirely, and will thus make reference to 
‘piercing the veil’. 
2.3.2  A Brief History of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil 
It is important to trace the origins of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and the reasons for 
the emergence of this phenomenon. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has its origin in the 
common law legal system particularly in England.39 Originally, it was a reaction to the rigid stand 
of the House of Lords in the case of Salomon which is well known for firmly establishing the 
principle that the corporate entity is distinct from those who own or control it.40 This decision thus 
not only established one of the most important principles of corporate personality that a company 
is a distinct entity apart from that of its shareholders,(thus limiting their liability), but it also led to 
the development of the exception to this rule namely, the doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’.41 
According to Marcantel the emergence of this phenomenon was an equitable response to the 
perceived or actual unfairness that could result from the application of strict limited liability 
statute.42 
It is therefore proper to have a survey of the application of the doctrine in the common law legal 
system with special emphasis on English Law. Accordingly, the legal framework of this doctrine 
in South Africa is therefore essentially built on foundations, which were put in place by the British 
in the middle of the nineteenth-century.43 There are several English cases where the issue of 
piercing the corporate veil in terms of common law principles has been dealt with. However, it 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Cassim op cit (n4) 47. 
39 B Kefyalew Lifting the Corporate Veil in Corporate Groups Under the Commercial Code of Ethiopia LLM (Addis 
Ababa) (2003) 60. 
40 EL Enyew ‘The Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil: It’s Legal and Judicial Recognition in Ethiopia’ (2012) 6 
Mizana Law Review 77 at 85. 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 JA Marcantel ‘Because Judges Are not Angels Either: Limiting Judicial Discretion by Introducing Objectivity into 
Piercing Doctrine’ (2010) 59 KAN LAW REVIEW 195. 
43 M Tong Review of Company Law in South Africa: Should South Africa Follow the British Example in 
Corporate Governance Matters This Time? LLM (Natal) (2003) 14. 
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should be noted that the English courts have in most instances relied on a categorising approach 
to piercing the corporate veil.44 Therefore, the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate personality 
must be looked at in a historical perspective. Thus, English case law will offer guidance, and, in 
some cases, even serves as persuasive authority, in interpreting the concept of piercing the 
corporate veil in South Africa.45 
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil began to assume a certain shape and form and became 
recognised in different forms both in the common law and civil law legal systems.46 Because the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a product of the common law, many courts have developed 
their own articulation of the circumstances in which the courts will pierce the veil.47 Several critics 
argue that the doctrine has become so abstract that judicial decision regarding piercing have 
become largely discretionary.48 As a result, many courts in different jurisdiction have 
inconsistently applied the doctrine.49 At the same, despite its wide application, the doctrine remains 
one of the least understood. 
This state of affairs can be observed not only in South Africa, but also in England. The uncertainty 
and confusion in regard to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is shared by courts in the 
United Kingdom. Thus, both in England and South Africa, courts have failed to formulate a single 
coherent principle upon which decisions to disregard the juristic personality are based.50 It is 
against this background that common law approaches in lifting the veil must be examined. 
The most vital and debatable question is when the courts will pierce the corporate veil. It is 
impossible to discern any broad principle of company law indicating the circumstances in which 
a court should pierce the corporate veil.51 To put it simply, there is no common, unifying principle, 
                                                          
44 EJ Cohn and C Simitis ‘Lifting the Veil in the Company Laws of the European Continent’ (1963) 12 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 189. 
 
 
45 T Moongalo Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertaking in South Africa 
2ed (2003) 34. 
46 Enyew op cit (n40) 85. 
47 MA Sweeney ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Ohio: The Need for a New Standard following Dombroski v Wellpoint 
Inc.’ (2009) 57 Cleveland State Law Review 951 at 953. 
48 Sweeney op cit (n47) 954. 
49 Enyew op cit (n40) 85 
50 HY Yeo ‘Revisiting the Alter Ego Exception in Corporate Veil Piercing’ (2015) 27 SACLJ177 at 179. 
51 Enyew op cit (n40) 86. 
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which underlies the occasional decision of the courts to pierce the corporate veil.52 Authorities in 
which the veil of incorporation has been pierced have not been of such consistency that any 
principle can be adduced. Some courts have followed a very strict and rigid approach where others 
have followed a more flexible approach.53 This and the various approaches followed will be 
discussed below to show that courts have struggled in determining the correct approach to be 
followed when piercing the corporate veil.  
2.4  Piercing the corporate veil in South Africa. 
The application of the doctrine of veil piercing in South Africa is far from settled.54 Despite the 
ambiguity surrounding the application of the piercing doctrine, several factors consistently 
influence decisions where courts allow piercing of the corporate veil. In the case of Cape Pacific, 
the then Appellate Division laid down a few principles relating to the circumstances in which a 
court would pierce the veil.55 However, these principles should not be seen as mandatory as the 
decision by a court to pierce the veil would depend on the facts of each case.56 This implies that 
we do not have a categorising approach in our law as categorisation might lead to uncertainty and 
the readiness of our courts to pierce the corporate veil has varied depending on the facts of the 
particular case.57 
The court in Cape Pacific stressed that courts should not lightly disregard a company’s separate 
personality, but should strive to get effect to and uphold it as far as possible.58 To do otherwise, 
the court said, would ‘negate and undermine the policy and principle that underpin the concept of 
separate legal personality and the consequences that attach to it’.59 But where fraud, dishonesty or 
other improper conduct are found to be present, other considerations will come into play.60 The 
need to preserve the separate corporate identity would in such circumstances have to be balanced 
                                                          
52 IM Rams &B Noakes ‘Piercing the corporate veil in Australia’ (2001) 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 250 
at 254. 
53 Cassim op cit (n4) 47. 
54 IM Rams &B Noakes op cit (n52) 254. 
55 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubber Controlling Investments supra (n28) at 802. 
56 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubber Controlling Investments supra (n28) at 802. 
57Cassim op cit (n4) 48. 
58 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubber Controlling Investments supra (n28) at 802. 
59Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubber Controlling Investments supra (n28) at 802. 
60 JT Pretorius Student Case Book on Business 3ed (2004) 59. 
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against policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing the corporate veil.61 To put it 
differently, the court adopted a balancing approach and laid down the principle that the concept of 
separate legal personality must be weighed against those principles in favour of piercing the veil.62 
The court further confirmed that each case will depend on its own facts.63 Indeed, it has been 
argued that courts tend to take a fact-based approach to questions of piercing the corporate veil, 
and no particular trend is readily discernible from an overview of the cases.64 
In Botha v Van Niekerk, Flemming J, came to the conclusion, after a comprehensive analysis of 
the legal position, that imposing personal liability on the shareholders or directors of a company 
would only become justifiable when it is clear that the third party suffered an unconscionable 
injustice as a result of improper conduct of the liable party.65 The court in Cape Pacific commented 
that this test was too rigid and suggested that a more flexible approach determined by the facts of 
each case must be adopted.66 However, a rigid application of the piercing doctrine has been widely 
criticised as sacrificing substance for form.67 
In addition the court in Cape Pacific Ltd remarked that if the facts of a particular case justify 
piercing of the corporate veil, the existence of another remedy should not in principle serve as a 
bar to a court piercing the corporate veil.68 The Appellate Division stated further that the existence 
of another remedy, or the failure to pursue one that was available, would be a relevant factor when 
policy considerations come into play, but it is not of overriding importance.69 Subsequent cases at 
common law did not favour this view. In Hülse-Reutter v Gödde, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
adopted a stricter approach in this respect and insisted that piercing of the veil should only be used 
as a last resort.70 Thus in Hülse-Reutter, the court accepted that the separate legal personality must 
be recognized and upheld except in unusual circumstances. The court further stated that the 
corporate veil would only be pierced if there was evidence of misuse or abuse of the distinction 
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between the company and those who control it and this has enabled those who control the company 
to gain an unfair advantage.71 In Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij the court agreed with this 
approach. Therefore it is only in exceptional circumstances that the corporate veil will be 
disregarded. 
In the more recent matter of Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim the court reiterated that 
directors and members of the company ordinarily enjoy extensive protection against personal 
liability, but that such protection can never be absolute, as the court has the power in certain 
exceptional circumstances to pierce the corporate veil and hold the directors and others personally 
liable for the debts of the company.72  
The Amlin case, fraud, agency, evasion, abuse of the corporate form, and the creation of a mere 
facade to conceal the true state of affairs or as a means or device to conceal wrongdoing or to avoid 
obligations, were all submitted as justifiable motivations for piercing the veil.73 Van der Linde and 
Lombard refer to equitable considerations to be taken into account when the necessity of piercing 
the corporate veil is considered.74 Meskin has a much stronger view, submitting that a court has 
no general discretion to disregard the company’s separate legal personality whenever it considers 
it just to do so.75 But that the principle should be that the court may pierce the veil only where 
otherwise, as a result only of its existence, fraud would exist or manifest justice would be denied.76 
Courts in which the veil of incorporation came under scrutiny have not been of consistency that 
any principle can be adduced. This demonstrates that there is no common, unifying principle, 
which underlies the occasional decision of the courts to pierce the corporate veil.77 These cases 
merely provide instances in which courts have on the facts refused to be bound by the form or fact 
of incorporation when justice requires the substance or reality to be investigated.78  
Courts in South Africa are generally reluctant to pierce the corporate veil, there seems to be a 
tendency to reinvent the wheel each time the matter is argued. Instead courts tend to take a fact-
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based approach, i.e. decide on case by case basis to questions of piercing the corporate veil. This 
is a clear acknowledgement that the circumstances in which a court would pierce the veil are far 
from settled, and much depended on a close analysis of the facts of each case. In addition, some 
courts have relied on categories or instances governing when a court will pierce the veil. 
Nevertheless, if the categorizing approach is followed it might give rise to inconsistency and 
uncertainty in our law which might lead to obscene results. This implies that we do not have a 
categorising approach in our law.  It is important to consider situations where fairness and public 
policy require the veil to be pierced and the specific case does not fall within the specific categories 
accepted by our court.79  Surely one cannot accept that a person should suffer an injustice purely 
based on such technicality.80 
As discussed the law is not settled with regards to the circumstances in which the corporate veil 
will be pierced and much will depend on a close analysis of the facts of each case, policy 
considerations and judicial judgment. The courts have dealt with this topic on a case-by-case in a 
rather haphazard way. The question thus arises whether the common-law doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil has been repealed by section 20(9) of the Companies Act to remedy these concerns. 
Nevertheless, it is important at this juncture to briefly visit other jurisdictions to try and establish 
how the courts dealt with this case. 
2.5  Piercing the corporate veil in England 
Since the decision over the classical case of Salomon, judges in the United Kingdom have 
recognised a number of discrete grounds that may lead to piercing of the corporate veil.81 These 
grounds have been developed under the concept of sham or facade, agency and single economic 
unit and have been exhaustively examined in the case of Adams v Cape Industries82, described by 
academics as a leading authority on this area of company law. Thus the corporate veil have been 
pierced when, for example, company promoters or directors have committed fraud or the corporate 
form has otherwise been abused, or a subsidiary company has been treated as the agent. 
                                                          
79 Van Huyssteen op cit (n25) 20. 
80 Domanski op cit (n18) 226. 
81 Domanski op cit (n18) 244. 
82 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA) at 539. 
20 
 
 The validity of these grounds for veil piercing has however been extensively criticised by 
Heintzman and Kain, which has led Lord Neuberger in VTB Capital v Nutritek to lament that no 
consistent principle emerges from categorising.83 This is so because a situation may arise where 
justice or equity calls for the court to pierce the veil, but a court may refuse to so on the ground 
that the facts of the situation do not fit into any of the established grounds.84  
The extent to which these grounds can be regarded as genuine examples of piercing the veil has 
been doubted by the recent decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel.85 
The Supreme Court in this case discussed the circumstances in which the courts are empowered to 
pierce the corporate veil of incorporation. It seems that this judgment has lead the United Kingdom 
to move towards a narrower application of the doctrine, to reinstate some certainty back into what 
has become a metaphorical mess. In addition, it is arguable that the bar for situations in which the 
corporate veil might be pierced has been set even higher.86 However, in order to fully understand 
the significance of Prest, it is important to look at the common law position before the Supreme 
Court decision in Prest, beginning with the court’s ability to pierce the veil in cases where the 
company was being used to perpetrate fraud, or being used to evade a legal obligation which, 
following Prest, is likely to be the only instance in which the veil can be pierced. It should be noted 
at the outset that the extent to which some of these instance can be regarded as genuine grounds 
of piercing the veil has been doubted by the Supreme Court in what is now the leading case, namely 
Prest. 
In Adams, the court stated that ‘there is one well recognised exception to the rule prohibiting the 
piercing of the corporate veil’.87 This is where the company is used to perpetrate fraud, or where 
the company is a façade or a sham. The two classic example of the fraud exception are Gilford 
Motor v Horne and Lipman v Jones. In the former case, Mr Horne sought to escape a restraint of 
trade agreement by setting up a company and engaging in the prohibited business through his 
company rather than in his own name. The Court of Appeal clearly considered that Mr Horne 
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formed the company and made the company compete so that he was not competing in his own 
name, but because he was acting through the instrumentality of the company that he formed with 
the intention of escaping his contractual obligations, the court saw this as a ‘sham’ since it was the 
same person competing and thus violating the restraint.88 In other words the company was formed 
to enable Mr Horne to continue to breach the agreement. Based on the aforesaid, the court pierced 
the corporate veil by granting an order restraining both the former employee and the company 
from competing with the plaintiff. Concurring with the majority judgment, Lawrence LJ confirmed 
that the defendant company was a ‘channel’ used by Mr Horne for the benefit to obtain the 
advantages of the customers of the defendant company ought to be restrained together with Mr 
Horne.89 
In the judgment of Lipman,90 the defendant had agreed to sell freehold land with registered title to 
the plaintiff for a certain amount. The defendant subsequently sold and transferred the land to the 
company, which he acquired and in which he became the shareholder and the director with other 
persons. After, changing his mind and transferred the land to the company that he controlled, the 
defendant could not fulfil his contractual obligations to the plaintiff. The court specifically referred 
to the judgement of Gilford case, and held that the company was a ‘mask’, which Mr Lipman held 
before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity. Accordingly, the court 
pierced the corporate veil against both the defendants.91 In the case of Faiza Hashem v Ali Shayif, 
Munby J also remarked that a company may be a façade even though it was not originally 
incorporated with any deceptive intent.92 The question is whether it is being used as a façade at the 
time of the relevant transaction. However, this ground for piercing the veil of incorporation, 
provided there is clear impropriety in the use of the corporate structure, appears to have survived 
the recent trend in veil piercing, which will be discussed below in depth.93 
Moving to the traditional ground of agency, it should be noted from the outset that a finding of 
agency does not, strictly speaking, pierce the corporate veil, as it respects the separate personalities 
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of both the company.94 However, the practical effect of a finding of agency can be to undermine 
the separation between the company and those in control of the incorporation.95 For example, if a 
third party contracting with the company successfully argued that the company had contracted as 
an agent for its directors or shareholders, therefore those in control of such a company would be 
liable on the contract to the third party. The court in Salomon rejected the conclusion that Solomon 
& Co Ltd was an agent of Mr Aron Solomon and the court established that a company is not as 
such the agent of its shareholders.96 But in certain circumstances it may be that, on the particular 
facts, the normal relationship between a company and those in control is in fact inverted, whether 
expressly or impliedly.97 This may occur for instance where controlling shareholder or directors 
do not treat the company as a separate entity, but treat it as if it were merely a means of furthering 
their own private business affairs.98 In this instance the company may be regarded as the ‘agent’ 
of its controlling shareholders and as such courts will impose liability on the shareholders in their 
capacity as the principal.99 In treating the company as the agent of those in control, the separate 
legal personality of the company is still recognised .Hence the corporate veil is not pierced but 
liability is imposed personally on the directors in their capacity as the principal company. 
Therefore, the effect of piercing the corporate veil is achieved by establishing an agency 
relationship, without having to pierce the veil.100  
The ‘single economic unit’ theory of piercing the corporate veil is another way that the courts 
avoid having to pierce the veil in England. In reality, treating a group of companies as one single 
unit is not entirely disregarding the entity, but disregard the ‘separateness’ of their legal existence 
from one another since each company in a group of companies is a separate legal entity with its 
own separate legal personality, rights and liabilities separate from those of the other member 
companies.101 The fact that a group of companies effectively forms one economic unit does not 
necessarily mean that the separate identity of each company is to be ignored and that the group is 
to be treated as one entity. However, in recent years there has been a more relaxed approach to the 
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application of this principle that a holding company and its subsidiary are separate legal entities.102 
Courts in England apply the single economic unit ground to pierce the corporate veil in situations 
where two or more corporations are not operated as wholly separate entities, but instead combine 
their resources to achieve a common business purpose.103 Thus, in The United Kingdom the courts 
have been prepared to disregard the separate legal entities of the various holding and subsidiary 
companies in a group and have, for certain purposes, treated them as one ‘economic entity’.104 
When the corporate veil is pierced in a group of companies, the court treats the group as a single 
entity as opposed to a collection of different corporate entities.  
This culminated in the decision of DHN Food Ltd v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets, where 
the English Court of Appeal treated the three companies in a group as single economic entity.105 
The court stated that there was evidence of a tendency by courts to ignore the separate legal entities 
of various companies within a group and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole group. 
But in Adams v Cape, which also dealt with the question of piercing the veil in the group context, 
the English Court of Appeal adopted a stricter approach and asserted that courts are not entitled to 
disregard the separate legal personality of a company in a group simply because it is just to do 
so.106  
This categorising approach has at times caused more certainty than justice in the English 
jurisprudence, and threatened the protection that incorporations provides.107 Domanski submits 
that a categorising of instances where the courts may be willing to pierce the corporate veil may 
lead to a strict approach, especially in those instances where there has been no abuse of the 
corporate entity and the company itself is desirous that the veil should be pierced.108 A recent shift 
has seen the United Kingdom move towards a narrower application of the doctrine, to reinstate 
some certainty back into what has become a metaphorical mess. This narrow approach of the 
Supreme Court in Prest will be analysed below. 
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2.5.1  The new approach in Prest 
Now that we have established the common law position as it stood before the Prest case, it becomes 
essential at this juncture to discuss how this judgment contributed to the development of this 
doctrine. Before delving further into the Prest case it is helpful to briefly discuss the relevant facts 
and history of this key judgment. 
The issue before the Supreme Court in Prest was whether a number of properties belonging to the 
Petrodel Group which were wholly owned by the group, could be transferred to Mr Prest’s wife in 
the context of divorce proceedings between them, given that the properties legally belonged not to 
Mr Prest but to his companies. The court found that, for reasons of wealth protection and avoidance 
of tax, the legal interest in the properties had been vested in the companies a long time before the 
marriage had dissolved.109 Accordingly, the court found that the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil was not applicable because the husband’s actions did not conceal or evade any legal obligation 
to his wife, nor was he concealing or evading the law in relation to the distribution of assets of the 
marriage upon its dissolution.110 However, the UK Supreme Court did find in favour of the wife 
in this matter on another ground. 
 Instead, the Supreme Court held that the properties vested in the companies were held by the 
husband’s companies on trust for him and they were accordingly properties to which the husband 
was entitled, either in possession or reversion.111 Lord Sumption confirmed that the corporate veil 
may only be pierced where a corporate structure has been implemented or used to avoid an existing 
legal obligation.112 In the course of his judgment, Lord Sumption tacitly applied the previous 
‘façade’ or ‘sham’ test for ignoring the separate personality of a company because he said that 
there was no intention to use the companies as a sham or façade since the arrangement predated 
the marriage. Therefore, the Lord Sumption recognised the companies’ separate legal personality 
and said that they were holding properties on trust for Prest. 
The Supreme Court in this case adopted a conservative approach towards the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil and commented pertinently that ‘if it is not necessary to pierce the corporate 
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veil, it is not appropriate to do so, because on that footing there is no public policy imperative 
which justifies that course’.113 Following this judgment, it is arguable that the Supreme Court 
limited the grounds on which the veil can be pierced and used the public policy as mechanism to 
justify such conduct. Hence, a court cannot, and should not, pierce the corporate veil merely 
because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of justice. In addition, the court recognised 
that veil piercing is an extraordinary remedy and measure of last resort as has always been the 
case. 
Accordingly, it is clear that Lord Sumption does not regard many of the grounds discussed as true 
situations in which the veil was pierced, especially those grounds involving groups of companies 
or a relationship of agency.114 Lord Sumption emphasised that these grounds have nothing to do 
with corporate veil piercing and that should not confuse agency and single unit as grounds of veil 
piercing. Therefore, these grounds should not have been categorised as such.115 Therefore, the 
judgment must now be regarded as the leading case in this area and casts significant doubt on the 
validity of many of the grounds discussed above. However, for situations in which the corporate 
veil might be pierced, the bar has arguably been set even higher than it was prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Prest.116 It can be logical to argue that this judgment provides some welcome 
clarity and simplicity in that it provides guidance on the limited circumstances in which veil 
piercing may be pierced. Based on this judgment, courts around the world must begin to take a 
more cautious approach to the veil-piercing doctrine in the wake of the Prest case. 
2.5 Conclusion 
To sum up, case law in South Africa has demonstrated that the courts are generally reluctant to lift 
the corporate veil. A consistent guiding principle has not yet evolved to enable us to predict with 
any degree of certainty as to when the court will pierce the veil of a company. In short, there is no 
single uniform standard for deciding and justifying veil piercing and much will depend on a close 
analysis of the facts of each case and, of course, judicial judgment. Accordingly, the question then 
arises as to how courts should remedy this problem? In order to rectify this inconsistency the South 
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African courts should adopt a broad, unifying common-law principle that could serve as a basic 
for deciding piercing cases in a more logical and juridical satisfactory manner. This issue has now 
been dealt with in section 20(9). Some regard this as a codification of the common law veil piercing 
and this legislative provision appears to be an improvement of a vague and unpredicted rule. To 
understand this provision, its impact on the common law veil piercing and applicability, a detailed 

















CHAPTER 3   Interpretation of Section 20(9) of the Companies Act: Ex Parte 
Gore 
3.1 Introduction 
For the first time in our jurisprudence the Companies Act 71 of 2008 introduced a statutory 
provision by way of section 20(9), permitting courts to discard the separate legal personality of the 
company and to pierce the corporate veil if there has been an ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic 
personality of the company. Section 20(9) codified the common law doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil and reads as follows: 
‘If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company is involved, a court 
finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the company, or any act by or on behalf of the 
company constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity, 
the court may – 
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of any right, obligation or 
liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company or, in the case of a non-profit company, a member 
of the company, or of another person specified in the declaration; and  
(b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration contemplated in 
paragraph (a)’. 
Thus section 20(9) gives the judiciary a general statutory discretion to pierce the corporate veil. 
This gives rise to two important questions namely, what impact this has on the existing common 
law and secondly how this provision will be interpreted by our courts. However, the common law 
principles as discussed would remain relevant and continue to apply. In my opinion, it would be 
appropriate to regard section 20(9) as supplemental to the common law, rather than substitutive.117 
This is so because the new statutory provision gives more certainty and visibility to the doctrine 
of piercing the veil, but a danger is that it may result in the doctrine becoming inflexible, 
particularly if the courts interpret the provision in a highly technical way.118 In addition, the 
interpretation of section 20(9) gives rise to many questions and uncertainties. For instance, the 
terms ‘unconscionable abuse’ and ‘interested persons’ are not defined anywhere in the Act. It is 
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also not clear whether the section overrides the principle at common law that the doctrine is an 
exceptional remedy to be used only as a last resort. Answers thereto will depend on the 
interpretation adopted by the courts.  
This statutory provision came under scrutiny for the first time in Gore. In the course of its 
judgment, the court answered some of the questions posed above and usefully set out some 
important guidelines in regard to the interpretation and application of section 20(9). In order to 
evaluate the court’s interpretation of this provision a detailed discussion on the traditional theories 
of statutory interpretation will be discussed in greater detail below. Many theories exist, some of 
which have dominated over the years. These theories of interpretation are deemed to be 
explanatory and justificatory and are therefore also seen as the different approaches to the 
interpretation of statutes. In addition, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
brought about a new legal dispensation to the interpretation of statutes in our law. Based on this 
constitutional dispensation the interpretation of statutes should comply with constitutional norms, 
promoting constitutional values and objectives.119 This has a profound impact on the approaches 
to statutory interpretation, which will be discussed in depth. It becomes clear in recent judgments 
that our courts are placing emphases on the importance of the Constitution when interpreting 
statues.120 
3.2 Theories of statutory interpretation in South Africa 
Over the years, courts have developed principles of interpreting statutes. Instead of discussing all 
the theories of interpretation, which could form a thesis on its own, this study will highlight a few 
of the most important ones as defined in case law and academic writings. These theories will assist 
in the discussion on the interpretation of section 20(9) with particular reference to the discussion 
in Gore. Firstly, a discussion on the different approaches and theoretical positions that South 
African courts have assumed and invoked in day-to day practice will be considered. The purposive 
approach coupled with contextualism is regarded as the new or modern approach to the 
interpretation of statutes in general.121 This approach was adopted by the courts in its desire to go 
beyond the literal grammatical meaning of words in order to establish the intention of the 
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legislature. In order to get a clear understanding of this modern approach a detailed discussion on 
how the courts apply this approach will be discussed in depth. This does not mean we should turn 
a blind eye to the common-law theories of statutory interpretation because every interpretation 
must fall within one of the theories. 
According to the literalism movement in its crude, unqualified form the meaning of a statutory 
provision can be retrieved from the actual words in which the statute is couched, regardless of 
manifestly unjust or even absurd consequences.122 The literalist view generally means that the 
particular words to be interpreted are taken out of the enactment and accorded a literal or 
grammatical meaning.123 The interpreter should concentrate primarily on the literal meaning of the 
provision to be interpreted. If the meaning of the word is clear, it should be put into effect and it 
must be equated with the legislator’s intention. The literal approach was succinctly expounded in 
the classic dictum of Grey v Pearson by Lord Wensleydale when he stated that only when the 
‘plain meaning’ of the word is vague or misleading and would result in absurd result or 
inconsistency then the court may deviate from the literal meaning to avoid such an absurdity.124 In 
Union Government v Mack it was held that the intention of the legislature should be deduced from 
the particular words or phrases used in the legislation.125 Courts came to regard the literal meaning 
as analogous with what the legislature intended. As expected there are a number of criticisms 
which have been raised against the literal approach. It has been argued that the view that legislative 
text can be clear and unambiguous must be questioned.  This is so because there are only a few 
texts which are so clear that only one interpretation is possible. 
It is also important to note that the literal approach leaves little or no room for judicial law making, 
thus turning courts into mechanical interpreters.  This view creates the impression that once the 
legislature has spoken, the courts cease to have any law-making function. Taking into account the 
above mentioned criticisms it will be naive that the courts should simply rely on the literal meaning 
of the words. Now that we have established the inadequacies of this form of interpretation, it 
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becomes essential at this juncture to activate another approach capable of bringing the meaning of 
the words or language into context namely, the contextual approach. 
This approach is concerned with the clarification of the meaning of a particular legislative 
provision in conjunction with the legislative text as a whole, as well as other contextual 
considerations.126 When looking at the context of a statutory instrument one must not only have 
regard to the language of the entire statute, but also the purpose and background of the statute.127 
This was also confirmed by the SCA in Hoban v Absa Bank Ltd.128 Nevertheless, the Constitutional 
Court in Harksen v Lane has emphasized the importance of construing constitutional provisions in 
context holding that this includes the history and background of the statute as well as other 
provisions within the statute.129 In addition, where the language is clear and unambiguous the court 
must read in context. This was also confirmed by the court in University of Cape Town v Cape Bar 
Council in which it was held that the court has to examine all the contextual factors in ascertaining 
the intention of the legislature, irrespective of whether or not the words of the legislation are clear 
and unambiguous.130 However, it is important to note that this theory of interpretation goes hand 
in hand with the contextual approach, which will be discussed below in detail. This is so because 
the purposive approach attributes meaning to a legislative provision in the light of the purpose it 
seeks to achieve, thus the purpose of the legislation is the prevailing factor in interpretation and 
the contextual approach is used to establish that purpose.131  
With this in mind, the search for the purpose of legislation requires a purposive approach which 
recognises the contextual framework of the legislation right from the outset.132 This rule, 
commonly known as the mischief rule, was developed in the famous Heydon case.133 The mischief 
rule is applied by the courts in circumstances where the provision in question was enacted to 
remedy a defect. In applying the rule, the court is essentially asking four questions: what was the 
legal position before the legislation was adopted, what the defects in the common law are, what 
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remedy was provided by the legislature to solve this problem, and the true reason for the remedies. 
It is to be noted that the application of the mischief rule gives the judge more discretion when 
interpreting statutes. The purposive approach to statutory interpretation has been followed in 
numerous cases in South Africa and has been accepted by the Appellate Division in the case of 
Hleka v Johannesburg City Council.134 It is further important to note that the Constitution 
mandates a purposive and value-based approach when interpreting statues in South Africa as set 
out in section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996(hereafter ‘the 
Constitution’) which will be discussed in detail below.  
Taking into account the above, it would be rash to commend this approach to be the only viable 
approach applicable as this might create problems in our jurisprudence. For instance, to give effect 
to the purpose of the statute would mean that one should ascertain such purpose from the outset. 
This might become problematic as the purpose is determined by interpreting the statue first. It is 
because of these type of challenges that some writers are of the opinion that this approach should 
only be followed as a secondary aid to statutory interpretation.135  
Now that we have discussed the theoretical positions that South African courts have assumed over 
the last decade or two, it is therefore important at this point to look at the new dispensation in terms 
of section 39(2). This new interpretation paradigm entails value judgments and obliges the courts 
to adopt a different approach based on constitutional values. This will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
3.3 The New Constitutional Dispensation: A Purposive Approach  
‘When interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bills of Rights’.136 
As mentioned above, South African statutory interpretation had for a long time been rooted in 
positivism and, prior to the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, statutory interpretation 
more often than not proceeded in terms of the famous dictum in Venter v R.137 In terms of this 
‘golden rule’, the aim of interpretation was to ascertain the intention which the legislature meant 
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to express from the language which it employed.138 This traditional approach to statutory 
interpretation was characterised by strict devotion to the legislative text, and parliamentary 
sovereignty.139 
It was assumed that the legislature encodes its intention within the language of the statutory 
provision and that, when clear and unambiguous, the words would disclose the true meaning of 
the provision.140 Nevertheless, the chief problem of the literal approach was that it assumes that 
language has a fixed and ordinary effect so that the correct use thereof will always reveal the true 
intention of the legislature. But, as Du Plessis points out, language is always open-ended and makes 
for a proliferation of meanings.141 With this in mind, it is logical to argue for the reshaping of the 
judiciary’s approach to statutory interpretation in the wake of the introduction of a supreme 
Constitution and the concomitant exigencies of constitutional interpretation.142 
The advent of constitutional democracy has, at least at a formal level, significantly dealt a blow to 
the orthodox text-based approach to statutory interpretation.143 Since the advent of the 
Constitution, the arguments against the continued application of the strict and literal rule have 
gained momentum. To put it simply, the adoption of section 39(2) of the Constitution resulted in 
a move away from a strict rule-based jurisprudence towards one that is value-based, underpinned 
by universally accepted values and norms. In fact, in Du Plessis v De Klerk, it was said that 
constitutional interpretation is concerned with the recognition and application of constitutional 
issues and not with the literal meaning of legislation.144 However, this does not seek to deprive 
statutes of their worth, but to give it a new direction.145 In other words, we should not give a blind 
eye to the literal meaning of the legislation. This is because the literal meaning will continue to 
apply as a secondary aid to statutory interpretation. 
In Matiso v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison Froneman J illustrated the influence 
of the supreme Constitution on the interpretation of statutes as follows: 
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‘The interpretive notion of ascertaining “the intention of the Legislature” does not apply in a system of 
judicial review based on the supremacy of the Constitution, for the simple reason that the Constitution is 
sovereign and not the Legislature. This means that both the purpose and method of statutory interpretation 
should be different from what it was before the commencement of the Constitution on 27 April 1994. The 
purpose now is to test legislation and administrative action against the values and principles imposed by the 
Constitution. The purpose necessarily has an impact on the manner in which both the Constitution itself and 
a particular piece of legislation said to be in conflict with should be interpreted….’146  
From my point of view this represents a new direction and shift in the interpretation of statutes. This is so 
because the interpretation of statutes now starts with the Constitution, and not with the legislative text. 
According to Froneman J statutory interpretation in this sense is thus primarily concerned with the 
recognition and application of constitutional values and not with a search to find the literal meaning 
of the statute due to the fact that all statutory law must be consistent with the values and principles 
enshrined in the Constitution.147 In my view the ‘intention of the legislature’ ought to apply as a 
secondary aid in the system of judicial review based on the supremacy of the Constitution because 
the Constitution and not Parliament, is sovereign. This entails that when interpreting a particular 
statute one should go one step further by ensuring that the interpretation is in line with the core 
values expressed in the Constitution. 
In my own opinion this represents a new direction as statues should now be interpreted having due 
regard to the Constitution, its values and objectives. However, it should be noted that traditional 
principles of statutory interpretation still applies as secondary aids to interpretation. This is also in 
line with the teleological approach to statutory interpretation. This approach emphasises 
fundamental constitutional values. According to this approach the main aim and purpose of the 
provision must be ascertained against the fundamental constitutional values.148 The fundamental 
values in the Constitution form the foundation of a normative jurisprudence during which 
legislation and actions are evaluated against and filtered through those constitutional values.149 In 
Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa, Sachs J explained the teleological approach 
of interpretation as follows: 
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‘The values that must suffuse the whole process are derived from the concept of an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality, several times referred to in the Constitution…’150 
In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd, 
the Constitutional Court took the same approach and stated that all statutes must be interpreted 
through the prism of the Bill of Rights.151 This means that the teleological approach aligns with 
the constitutional mandate to interpret all statutes through the prism of the Bill of Rights. Because 
the Constitution is the ultimate yardstick against which every statute is interpreted and reviewed, 
as it requires interpreters to look beyond the text of statutory provisions, even when clear and 
unambiguous. As such, broad purposive interpretation is slowly supplanting or has already 
supplanted the old ‘golden rule’ of statutory interpretation as described above.152 
Another Constitutional Court judgment in which this movement of a wider value-based approach 
was followed was in the Goedgelegan case.153 Moseneke DCJ clearly stated his favour towards a 
value-based approach by stating that ‘….the Constitution must be interpreted purposively…many 
pronouncement in this court and other courts endeavor to encapsulate this approach’.154 He further 
confirmed his support for this approach by stating that when interpreting a statute a generous 
approach should be followed and not an approach that is merely focused on the text.155 This 
‘generous’ approach implies that statutes should be interpreted in such a way as to afford the fullest 
protection possible of the claimant’s constitutional guarantees.156 This is a clear indication that our 
courts are placing emphases on the importance of the Constitution when interpreting statutes and 
acknowledging the transition from a strict rule-based jurisprudence towards one that is value 
based, underpinned by universally accepted values and norms.  
Not only the judiciary, but also many commentators have suggested that a purposive approach 
should be followed which will promote the democratic values enshrined in the new Constitution. 
However, the inclusion of a purpose provision will also be important in a more substantive sense 
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in that it will force judges, judicial officers and all interpreters of legislation to accept a purposive 
and value-coherent methodology of interpretation that is fully in line with the demands of the new 
constitutional order, more specifically section 39(2).157 In light of the dynamic development of our 
law, the Companies Act includes a purpose provision that reflects many of the constitution’s own 
values as will be discussed in depth below, and South African corporate law is by no means exempt 
from the teleological dimension of statutory interpretation. 
Despite the ostensible movement towards adoption of a purposive approach towards statutory 
interpretation not all the courts in South Africa hold this view, and continue to follow a literalist 
approach to interpretation, without reference to the supreme Constitution and its values.158 The 
inherent pitfalls of such an approach must also be recognized. In Public Carriers Association v 
Toll Road Concessionaries, Smallberger JA stated that ‘the notion of what is known as a 
‘purposive construction’ in not entirely alien to our law’.159 Unfortunately, Smalberger JA 
preferred to follow the literal interpretation principle as being entrenched in our law. He was of 
the opinion that it was only in cases of ambiguity that there was room for a purposive approach. 
In Commissioner, SARS v Executor, Frith’s Estate the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated the 
well-known traditional rule of interpretation as follows: 
‘The primary rule in construction of a statutory provision is (as is well established) to ascertain the intention 
of the legislator and (as is equally well established) one seeks to achieve this, in the first instance, by giving 
the words under consideration their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so would lead to an absurdity 
so glaring that the Legislature could not have contemplated it.’160 
However, it is said that one cannot accept this approach to be the only approach applicable within 
our law as this might create problems. The most apparent criticism is that an unnecessary effort to 
establish the purpose or intent of the legislature can give rise to a negation of the meaning of the 
express words used in a particular statute.161 Secondly, if the purposive approach is followed 
strictly, it might become quite restrictive because it is aimed at a specific purpose. This might 
                                                          
157 Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E) at 635. 
158 P A Swanepoel An Analysis of the Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of South Africa Legislation LLM 
(Pretoria) (2012) 48. 
159 Public Carriers Association and Others v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 925(A) at 943. 
160 Commissioner, SARS v Executor, Frith’s Estate 2001 (2) SA 261 (SCA) at 273. 
161 GE Davenish ‘African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission: The new methodology and theory of 
statutory interpretation in South Africa (2006) 123 SALJ 399. 
36 
 
cause some important values to be disregarded. This might lead to some important core values to 
be overlooked.162 Thirdly, statutory interpretation can become too complex to capture the 
interpretative approach within one single element such as the purpose of the statute.163 Lastly, to 
give effect to the purpose of a statute would mean that one should ascertain such purpose from the 
outset. This might become problematic as the purpose is determined by interpreting the statute 
first. 
3.4 Guidelines on applying the purposive approach to interpreting legislation 
It is submitted that the judiciary has accepted that the purposive approach to the interpretation of 
legislation is the correct one to follow, at least in principle. However, they have not really 
attempted to give any step-by-step guidelines on how the approach works in practice. Miers and 
Page suggests the following effective three-stepped approach:164 
a) The Act as a whole is to be read in its entire context so as to ascertain the intention of 
Parliament (the law as expressly or impliedly enacted by the words), the object of the Act 
(the ends sought to be achieved), and the scheme of the Act (the relation between the 
individual provisions of the Act). 
b) The words of the individual provisions to be applied to the particular case under 
consideration are then to be read in their grammatical and ordinary sense in the light of the 
intention of Parliament, embodied in the Act, and if they are clear and unambiguous and in 
harmony with the intention, object and scheme and with the general body of the law, that 
is the end. 
c) If the words are apparently obscure or ambiguous, then the meaning that best accords with 
the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, but one which 
the words are reasonably capable of bearing, is to be given them. 
In my opinion if this three-stepped methodology is followed, the purposive approach would not be 
far from the requirements of the Constitution to promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the 
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Bills of Rights in the interpretation of legislation.165 It is submitted that this leads to fairness and 
is thus in line with the spirit and purport of the Constitution. 
3.5 Mandate to promote values of the Constitution in the Companies Act. 
The Companies Act expressly provides that in interpreting this legislation, it must be interpreted 
and applied in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in sections 5(1) and 7.  One of 
those stated purposes is the promotion of compliance with the Bill of Rights.166 This in itself 
prescribes a purposive approach for the interpretation of the Companies Act and thus gives effect 
to section 39(2) as discussed above. In addition, this gives a clear indication that a teleological 
approach should be followed when interpreting the provisions in the Companies Act. Furthermore, 
it is of vital importance to take note of section 158, which also supports the purposive approach 
by providing that ‘….a court must develop the common law as necessary to improve the realisation 
and enjoyment of rights established by this Act’. This is so because section 158 sets out the 
remedies available to ensure that the purpose are reached. Section 158(a) further confirms that the 
courts have to develop the common law as necessary to improve the realisation and enjoyment of 
the rights provided for in the Companies Act. Subsections 158(b) (i) and (ii) further state that a 
court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Companies Act.167 This was a bold move 
considering that for many years constitutional law and company law existed as if they were largely 
separate disciplines with a very limited area of overlap.168 The reference to the Bill of Rights 
recorded in sections 7 and 158 of the Companies Act seems to place even more emphasis on the 
fact that the value and rights are confirmed in the Constitution has become imperative when 
applying and interpreting the Companies Act. 
3.6 Analysis of the Ex Parte Gore judgment 
Many interpretative questions have been raised around section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008, 
as discussed above. These questions have been answered in the recent case of Gore which will be 
discussed in depth hereinafter. In Gore the Western Cape High Court, per Binns-Ward J, delivered 
the first judgment on the application and interpretation of section 20(9). The case dealt with the 
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issue of piercing the corporate veil in the context of company groups. The court applied section 
20(9) to the facts before it and resolved to pierce the corporate veil. The discussion below will 
examine some of the guidelines provided by Gore for the interpretation of section 20(9). As 
mentioned, this judgment gives valuable insight into the questions raised above, concerning the 
interpretation of section 20(9). However, before exploring further into Gore case it is helpful to 
briefly discuss the relevant facts of this key judgment in order to get a clear understanding of the 
issues before us. 
3.6.1 Facts of the case 
The applicants were the liquidators of 41 companies that had formed part of a group of companies, 
referred to as ‘the King Group’. The holding company was King Financial Holdings Limited 
(hereafter ‘KFH’), which was also in liquidation. The three King brothers were directors of KFH 
and most of its subsidiaries, and held a majority of the KFH shares, which enabled them to exercise 
control over the King Group. The companies in the King Group provided financial services by 
way of marketing investments in commercial and residential immovable properties. Investments 
solicited by the King Group were structured in the form of a purchase by an investor of shares in 
a member of the group. The acquisition of the shares was coupled with an extension of a loan by 
the investor concerned to the company of which he was to be a shareholder. The affairs of the King 
Group had been conducted in a manner that did not maintain any distinguishable corporate identity 
between the various companies in the group. As a consequence of the dishonest and chaotic 
administration of the affairs of the King Group, the liquidators of the constituent companies were 
unable to identify the relevant corporate entities against which the individual investor-creditors 
had claims. The question before the court was whether it should in these circumstances pierce the 
corporate veil and disregard the separate corporate personality of the various subsidiary 
companies, so that the assets of the subsidiary companies could be regarded as the assets of the 
holding company for purposes of the investors’ claims. The application was brought under the 
common law, alternatively in terms of section 20(9). 
3.6.2 The court’s findings 
The court first and foremost starts off by acknowledging that the circumstances in which a court 
would pierce the corporate veil were far from settled, and stated that much depends on a close 
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analysis of the facts of each case.169 The court noted that the common law does not provide for a 
closed list of circumstances in which the court will pierce the corporate veil.170  
The court held that that section 20(9) is a statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil and that 
the remedy could be used in a variety of circumstances as a remedy of first instance, and not as a 
last resort in circumstances where justice will not otherwise be done.171 In addition, the court noted 
that section 20(9) will not override, but rather supplement the common law instances of piercing 
the corporate veil.172  
The court further found that the entire group had in effect operated as one entity through the 
holding company, and that the King brothers had ‘treated all their companies as one’.173 It found 
that there was no distinction for practical purposes when it came to dealing with investor’s funds 
between KFH and the subsidiary companies. The court further held that the disregard for the 
separate entities within the group was so extensive as to impel the conclusion that the group was 
in fact a sham.174 This can be viewed as an acceptable threshold for determining abuse of separate 
legal personality.  The court came to the conclusion that the entire group had in effect operated as 
one entity through the holding company, and that the disregard of the separate entities within the 
group was so extensive as to impel the conclusion that the group was in fact a sham. The court 
opined that there was an unconscionable abuse of the corporate veil and therefore section 20(9) 
was applicable. 
Even though the court pierced the corporate veil in Gore, the court seemed to have adopted a very 
wide interpretation of the words ‘unconscionable abuse’, since it pierced the corporate veil on the 
basis that the King Group was a sham, and found that this had brought the activities of the group 
within the meaning of ‘unconscionable abuse’ in section 20(9). 
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3.6.3 The court’s interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
The judgment of Gore is important in the context of the interpretation of section 20(9). The 
significance of the judgment is that, while section 20(9) is not out of harmony with the piercing of 
the veil judgments that have been previously handed down by the courts, it shed light on the basis 
on which a court may disregard the corporate personality and makes the remedy one that is 
generally available whenever there has been an illegitimate use of the juristic personality of a 
company, especially in cases where this illegitimate use affects the interests of a third party 
adversely.175 The judgment answered some of the questions set out at the beginning of this study, 
and usefully set out some important guidelines in regard to the interpretation and application of 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act. It is the purpose of this study to examine in depth some of the 
guidelines provided by Gore in the discussion to follow. It will be argued that the wording and the 
interpretation of section 20(9) as decided in Gore result in giving courts very wide powers to pierce 
the corporate veil, which hitherto never existed under the common-law remedy of piercing the 
corporate veil. 
3.6.3.1  ‘Interested person’ under section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
The application to declare that the company be deemed not to be a juristic person must be brought 
by an ‘interested person’.176 Section 20(9) does not define the term ‘interested person’ or provide 
any guidance in regard to who would constitute an ‘interested person’ within the scope and ambit 
of the section. It is questionable why the legislature chose not to define the term and this does raise 
questions as to how the courts will interpret the term ‘interested person’. 
As a general rule a person who claims relief from a court in respect of any matter must establish 
that he or she has a direct interest in that matter in order to acquire the needed locus standi to seek 
relief.177 This entails that the direct interest should not be remote, and that it must be a real interest 
and not an abstract, academic or hypothetical interest. The test to determine whether a litigant’s 
interest in a particular case qualifies as a direct interest, or whether it is too remote, would always 
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depend on the particular facts of each individual case, and that no definite rule can be laid down.178 
In applying this declaration to section 20(9), each application before the court would necessitate 
the court’s examining whether the interest of the applicant in deeming a company not to be a 
juristic person is a direct interest that is not too remote, abstract, academic or hypothetical. The 
fact that no definite rule can be laid down to answer this question means that courts must exercise 
their own discretion on this issue on a case-by-case basis.179 This entails that the assessment of 
whether a litigant’s interest in a case qualifies as a direct interest, or whether it is too remote, would 
always depend on the particular facts of each individual case. 
Owing to the fact that section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (hereinafter ‘Close 
Corporations Act’)180 and section 20(9) of the Act are so similar, it is to be noted that the 
interpretation of the term ‘interested person’ under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act would 
offer some useful guidance in determining who an interested person would be for the purposes of 
bringing an application in term of section 20(9). This is so because some of the words of section 
20(9) were borrowed from section 65 of the Close Corporations Act. In TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville 
Vleismark v Du Plessis, which examined the meaning of the term ‘interested person’ in terms of 
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, the court remarked that the term ‘interested person’ is 
not to be interpreted too restrictively, but at the same time it is not to be interpreted too widely so 
as to include an indirect interest.181 The interest must be material, relevant or direct, and, in 
particular, it is limited to a financial or monetary interest. 
In Gore the court simply approved of and adopted the general principles stated in Jacobs v Waks.182 
The court stated that no mystique should be attached to the term ‘interested person’ and held that 
the standing of any person to seek a remedy in terms of the section 20(9) should be determined on 
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the basis of well-established principle.183 The court’s reasoning on this issue is quite interesting as 
the judgment, including the acknowledgement that the common law is not replaced by section 
20(9), gives effect to the presumption that the legislature will not change the existing law more 
than necessary.184 It is arguable that, by implication, the High Court did not require that an 
‘interested person’ under section 20(9) must have a financial interest or such interest to be 
measured in monetary terms. Nevertheless, this extends the scope of section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act much more widely than that of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, where a 
financial or monetary interest is a requirement.  
The approach followed by the court in Gore accords with the purposive trend in the interpretation 
of statutory provisions due to the fact that the court adopted a wide interpretation of the term 
‘interested person’. It should, however, be borne in mind that the unequivocal adoption of a 
purposive approach towards interpretation of the Companies Act is premised thereupon and that it 
should only be practiced in circumstances where the express wording of a statutory provision is 
not clear or where the adoption of the clear wording of a particular statutory provision would give 
rise to an ambiguity or results that could clearly not have been contemplated by the legislature.  
The purposive interpretation adopted by the court was aimed at giving effect to the object or 
purpose of legislation which includes encouraging the efficient and responsible management of 
companies and encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance.185 The court 
in Gore has, in my view, finally put a nail in the coffin of the literal or textual approach in its pure 
form by following a purposive interpretation. Although, the court in Gore managed to shed more 
light and visibility to the meaning of ‘interested person’ in section 20(9), the meaning of the term 
‘unconscionable abuse’ in the section remains unclear. However, the discussion to follow will 
attempt to unpack and to give meaning to the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ as decided in Gore. 
3.6.3.2  ‘Unconscionable abuse’ 
The term ‘unconscionable abuse’ is not defined in section 20(9) nor anywhere in the Act and the 
section does not provide any direction as to the circumstances that would constitutes an 
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‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity. This does 
raise many questions and uncertainties surrounding its application and interpretation. 
It is trite law that legislative language should be read in its ordinary sense.186 In order to determine 
the ordinary sense or meaning of legislative language a dictionary may be used as an aid. The term 
‘unconscionable’ can be defined as ‘not restrained by conscience’, or ‘unscrupulous’.187 ‘Abuse’ 
is defined as ‘an improper usage, corrupt practice’ and ‘to use incorrectly or misuse’.188 
Accordingly, in its ordinary sense, the ‘unconscionable abuse’ in section 20(9) requires an 
unscrupulous or unprincipled misuse of the juristic personality of the company as a separate entity. 
However, it is noteworthy that the term ‘unconscionable’ was first introduced to South African 
law in Botha v Van Niekerk when it was decided that personal liability only becomes justifiable 
when it is clear that the third party has suffered an ‘unconscionable injustice’ because of the unjust 
actions of the liable party.189 As discussed in the previous chapter, the Appellate Division in Cape 
Pacific rejected this test on the basis that it was rigid and held that a more flexible approach ought 
to be adopted, which would allow the facts of each case ultimately to determine whether the 
piercing of the veil was appropriate in the circumstances or not.190  
Some guidance may perhaps be obtained from the jurisprudence that has thus been developed in 
respect of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, which is worded similarly to section 20(9). 
Owing to the fact that section 65 and section 20(9) of the Companies Act are so similar it will be 
left to the courts to interpret whether there is a difference between the interpretation of the terms 
‘gross abuse’ in section 65 and ‘unconscionable abuse’ in section 20(9) and to what extent must 
the abuse go to before it may be considered to be unconscionable.191 It is submitted that courts in 
their effort to interpret the meaning and extent of the words ‘unconscionable abuse’ in section 
20(9) should adopt a similar approach used in the interpretation of the term ‘gross abuse’’ in 
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act as a point of reference.192 
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According to Binns Ward J in Gore the term ‘gross abuse’ as stated in the Close Corporations Act 
has a more extreme meaning than the term ‘unconscionable abuse’.193 This implies that for the 
corporate veil to be pierced under section 20(9), a lower standard of abuse must be proved as 
compared to the standard of abuse required for the corporate veil of a close corporation to be 
pierced under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act.194 It is not clear why the court in Gore 
suggested a lesser standard of abuse for section 20(9) as compared to section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act, when in general both companies and close corporations are statutorily formed 
and registered for the purpose of, and benefit of, limited liability.195 
Regarding the meaning of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of a company 
in section 20(9), Binns Ward J was willing to accept that the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ will 
encapsulate conduct that is associated with circumstances where the formation of companies are 
used as a ‘sham’, ‘device’, and ‘stratagem’.196 The court stated that this indicates that the remedy 
of piercing the corporate veil may be used whenever the illegitimate use of the concept of juristic 
personality adversely affects a third party in a way that reasonably should not be countenanced.197  
It is clear from the judgment that the judge did not apply a narrow literal approach, but adopted a 
very wide interpretation of the words ‘unconscionable abuse’. Thus attributing a wider meaning 
to the term to provide for wider application of section 20(9). This all gives effect to the purpose of 
the Companies Act in section 7 which includes encouraging the efficient and responsible 
management of companies and encouraging transparency. 
In addition, the court also set a lesser standard of abuse than that required for the piercing of the 
veil of close corporations under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act. Thus, in order for the 
corporate veil of a company to be pierced under section 20(9) of the Companies Act, a lower 
standard of abuse would need to be proved compared to the level of abuse required for the 
corporate veil of a close corporation to be pierced under section 65 of the Close Corporations 
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Act.198 This broadens the cases in which a court will pierce the veil compared to what the courts 
have been prepared to do prior to the enactment of this provision.199 
In addition, the application of a wider meaning of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ and the fact 
that the provision is unqualified, affords a rectification of the common-law philosophy that it 
should only be used as a last resort.200 This further confirms that the judge applied a purposive 
approach in the interpretation of section 20(9). Under this modern purposive approach, the default 
position is to ascertain the purpose underlying a provision in all cases and use the literal rule as 
secondary aid to the interpretation of statutes. This form of modern purposivism prevails over 
literalism in all cases, not just cases of absurdity or ambiguity. In this instance the main object of 
the Companies Act is to promote the development of the South African economy by encouraging 
transparency and high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, given the significant role 
of enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation.201 
The fact that the court in Gore broadens the interpretation of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’, 
together with the statutory remedy of veil piercing being available whenever the illegitimate use 
of the company’s separate legal personality affects one in a way that should not reasonably be 
countenanced, clearly shows that the judge comfortably accepts that section 20(9) can be seen as 
supplemental to the common law.202 This will find more value in the discussion to follow. In my 
view, it can be argued that the interpretation of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ will be dependent 
on the fact of each case and this will be open for interpretation by the courts. However, it should 
be noted that the interpretation of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ proposed by the court, is similar 
to the position at common law in relation to assessing whether to pierce the veil or not. Based on 
this it can be argued that there is no discord between the common law principle and section 20(9). 
3.6.3.3  Remedy of last resort: section 20(9) 
At common law, piercing the corporate veil is regarded as a drastic remedy that must be resorted 
to sparingly and as a very last resort in circumstances where justice will not otherwise be done.203 
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It is not clear from the reading of the section whether the same principle is to be applied to section 
20(9). The question is whether section 20(9) would also be utilized as a remedy of last resort or 
whether an applicant could rely on section 20(9) despite other remedies being available. 
The Judgment of Gore is authority for the view that the answer to this question is in the positive. 
Binns-Ward J remarked that the unqualified availability of the remedy under section 20(9) 
militates against an approach that the remedy should be granted only in the absence of any 
alternative remedy.204 It is submitted that the court’s interpretation of section 20(9) is in this respect 
correct. The significance of the judgment is that, while section 20(9) is not out of harmony with 
the piercing of the veil judgments that have been previously handed down by the courts, it in fact 
broadens the basis on which a court may disregard the corporate personality and makes the remedy 
one that is generally available whenever there has been an illegitimate use of the juristic personality 
of a company, especially in cases where this illegitimate use affects the interests of a third party 
adversely.205 This in itself promotes a purposive approach towards interpretation of the Companies 
Act. 
To put simply, the language of section 20(9) is drafted in very wide terms, which may be indicative 
of an appreciation by the legislature that the section may be applied widely in varying factual 
circumstances.206 This may mean that section 20(9) may be relied upon despite other remedies also 
having been available. The courts will now have a wider discretion to pierce the corporate veil 
under section 20(9) compared to the discretion under the common law where the remedy of 
piercing the veil was used as a last resort.207 This also brings the position under section 20(9) more 
into line with the dicta expressed by the Appellate Division in Cape Pacific, that piercing the 
corporate veil is no longer a remedy of last resort.208 This is because there is a statutory alternative 
to veil piercing. It is clear that Binns-Ward J’s approach to the matter of interpretation is purposive 
and value-based rather than literal. 
An important manifestation of this approach is the mischief rule which has been accepted by our 
courts including the Constitutional court. Binns-Ward J clearly acknowledged that under the 
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common law a judicial philosophy exists that the separate legal personality of a company should 
be disregarded only in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.209 In my view this is a perfect 
example of where the mischief rule has been applied because the court referred to the common-
law position before the legislation was adopted and the provision in question was enacted to 
remedy a defect. 
3.6.3.4  Does s 20(9) override the common law? 
There has been much debate in our jurisprudence as to whether the introduction of section 20(9) 
overrides the common law or the judicial instances of piercing the corporate veil. In Gore the court 
had no hesitation in finding that there is no clear intention that the common law is or is not replaced 
by this provision.210 Binns-Ward J refers to other sections in the statute which expressly states 
whether the common law has been replaced or still finds applicability. He confirms that based on 
these sections ‘…there is no express intention to that effect but, equally, there is no express 
indication that the intention is not to displace the common law’. This is a perfect example of where 
the wording of the particular provision in the context of the statute as a whole, is unclear rendering 
the literal approach to interpretation applicable. 
It was contended that the principles developed at common law with regard to piercing the corporate 
veil would serve as useful guidelines in interpreting section 20(9).211 Where the requirements of 
section 20(9) were not met and could not be relied on, the common-law remedy of piercing the 
veil would still apply.212 Binns-Ward J then further confirms that the provision needs to be read 
with subsections 5(1), (2) and (7) of the Companies Act requiring the interpretation of the provision 
to be done in context with the statute. According to this interpretation, the court stated that it was 
unable to identify any discord between section 20(9) and the approach to piercing the corporate 
veil evinced in cases decided before it came into operation. It seems to be clear that, based on the 
court’s approach to interpreting section 20(9), the new provision is a clear improvement on the 
previously vague and unpredictable common law rule of piercing the corporate veil. In light of 
this, the question to be answered now is whether the court in Gore followed the most recent trend, 
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namely the constitutional dispensation in the interpretation of section 20(9) and what implication 
this interpretation has for the existing rules or principles that apply in relation to piercing the 
corporate veil which will find more value in the discussion to follow. 
Since the advent of the Constitution, the arguments against the continued application of the strict 
and literal rule have gained momentum. Many commentators, including the judiciary, have 
suggested that a purposive approach should be followed which will promote the democratic values 
enshrined in the new Constitution. In light of this, the question to be answered is whether the court 
in Gore followed the most recent trend in the interpretation of statutes. One can be forced to accept 
that the court did recognised the values enshrined in the Constitution in the interpretation of section 
20(9). 
Binns-Ward J referred to the application of section 7 of the Companies Act in his interpretation of 
section 20(9). Section 7 read together with section 5 and 158 sets out the purposes of the 
Companies Act. One of the purposes being compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in 
the Constitution, in the application of company law.213 In referring to section 7, even though not 
expressly confirmed in his judgment, one can infer that the judge has shown his appreciation to 
the fact that the value-based purposive approach should be followed in the interpretation of section 
20(9).214 In addition, section 7 in itself gives effect to section 39(2) of the Constitution.  
The broad interpretation given to the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ by Binns-Ward J in Gore, 
together with the remedy of piercing the corporate veil being available whenever the illegitimate 
use of the company’s separate legal personality affects one in a way that should not reasonably be 
countenanced, make it clear that the legal bases upon which courts have hitherto been prepared to 
pierce the corporate veil under the common law have now been considerably extended under 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act.215 With this, one cannot come to any other conclusion that 
section 20(9) can be seen as the development of the common law to provide proper mechanism to 
ensure that the values as enshrined in section 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution are upheld in the 
corporate world. 
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The court acknowledged that the circumstances in which a court would pierce the veil were far 
from settled, and stated that much depended on a close analysis of the facts of each case, 
considerations of policy, judicial management, and economic effects it would have if the injustice 
caused is not rectified. This clearly confirms the importance of the values of the Constitution as 
discussed above, when applying section 20(9) to a particular matter. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In light of the vagueness and confusion which exist in regard to the common law doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil South Africa it seems to be clear that, based on the court’s approach in 
interpreting section 20(9), the new provision has conferred extensive powers on the South African 
courts to pierce the corporate veil, powers that do not exist under common law. The provision 
signifies a new way and shift in thinking in regard to the remedy of piercing the corporate veil. 
Finally, section 20(9) broadens the basis on which a court may disregard the corporate personality 
and makes the remedy one that is generally available whenever there has been an illegitimate use 
of the juristic personality of a company, especially in cases where this illegitimate use affects the 
interests of a third party adversely. In applying this statutory doctrine it is of fundamental 
importance that courts must strike a balance between the need to preserve a company’s separate 
legal personality and policy considerations in exercising their discretion whether to pierce the 












It is clear from the above case study that the courts in South Africa have grappled with the correct 
approach to justify the common law instances in which it is reasonable to override the principle of 
separate legal personality. Although there have been several attempts by the courts to determine 
the circumstances in which the courts will pierce the veil, the foregoing discussion has established 
that the search for a generally accepted justification for veil piercing decisions has so far proved 
difficult. However, it was also established that the readiness of South African courts to pierce the 
corporate veil has varied quite considerably depending on the close analysis facts of each case, 
consideration of policy and judicial judgment.216 This implies that South African courts do not 
follow the categorising approach and that there are no set categories of instances governing when 
courts will pierce the corporate veil which, according to most academics, may lead to unfavourable 
results.217 In addition, a judicial philosophy that the separate personality of juristic persons should 
be disregarded only in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort under the common law has 
been articulated in some recent South African judgments.218 With this in mind, it becomes difficult 
to state with any degree of accuracy the circumstances in which the courts will pierce the veil. 
Accordingly, the question then arises as to how courts should remedy this problem. 
Furthermore, the study also established that this uncertainty and confusion in regard to the doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil is shared by courts in the United Kingdom. In Prest, commenting on 
the question of the circumstances when the corporate veil would be pierced, the Supreme Court 
asserted that ‘the question is heavily burdened by authority, much of it characterised by incautious 
dicta and inadequate reasoning’.219 Nevertheless, the judgment of Lord Sumption in Prest has 
brought some certainty to the concept of veil piercing in England. This is so because the court 
rejected some of the unrelated common law grounds of piercing the corporate veil as the true 
situations in which the veil can be pierced. Lord Sumption emphasised that these grounds have 
nothing to do with corporate veil piercing and should not have been categorised as such.220 To put 
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it differently, the court in Prest rejected the categorising approach to veil piercing. Such rejection 
of a categorising approach is commendable because categorising could lead to uncertainty.221 The 
Supreme Court held that the veil should, therefore, be pierced only where necessary ‘to prevent 
the abuse of corporate legal personality’, such as abuse being using the company to evade the law 
or to frustrate its enforcement, and ‘only for the purpose of depriving the company or its controller 
of the advantage they would otherwise have obtained’.222 Following this pivotal decision, it is 
arguable that the court made changes to the concept of veil piercing in England and the bar for 
situations in which the corporate veil might be pierced has been set even higher. As discussed the 
judgment further provides guidance on the limited circumstances in which veil piercing may be 
permitted. 
In order to rectify this inconsistency, South African courts should adopt a narrow, and unifying 
principle that could serve as a basic for deciding piercing cases in a more logical and satisfactory 
manner.223 Perhaps the approach envisaged in the Prest case ought to be applied to unify and 
rationalise piercing decisions on the basis of a single underlying principle and as such it may prove 
capable of bringing order and clarity into an untidy area of the law. To a certain extent, the Prest 
case is a significant case in setting out the limited circumstances in which veil piercing may occur 
in future. 
Nevertheless, South African courts are not bound by precedent set by foreign courts and are free 
to consider alternatives approaches to piercing the corporate veil in foreign jurisdictions. This is 
soundly affirmed in section 39(1) (b) of the Constitution, which states that courts have the 
discretion to consider foreign law.224 It is submitted that, in the light of the confusion and 
uncertainty in the common law on the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, 
courts must strive to clarify the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in South African law.225 As 
the Supreme Court held in Prest, it is important to maintain clarity and simplicity in piercing the 
corporate veil, and if the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is to exist, ‘the circumstances in 
which it can apply must be limited and as clear as possible’.226 It seems logical to say that when 
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dealing with veil piercing matters courts must endeavour to develop ways that will maintain clarity 
and simplicity, so as to demystify the confusion which exists in the common law.227 
At the very least, the Prest ruling should stimulate South African courts to consider ways that can 
be used to disregard the separate legal personality of incorporations based on the fraudulent 
evasion concept identified in Prest. In other words, the South African test for veil piercing should 
be brought in line with the more narrow approach articulated by Lord Sumption. As stated above, 
courts must exercise caution and wisdom to ensure that they do not develop a disproportionate and 
inappropriate application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in South African law.228  
However, it would be rash to suggest that the principle formulated in Prest is capable of resolving 
all the problems posed by the concept of separate corporate entity. Where there is fraud and 
dishonesty or other improper conduct, as formulated in Prest, the need to preserve the separate 
corporate entity would in such circumstances have to be balanced against policy considerations 
which arise in favour of piercing the corporate veil. In other words, courts should adopt the 
balancing approach as a supplement to the test formulated in Prest for piercing the corporate veil, 
in order to achieve a more equitable result. This approach accords with the position in the Cape 
Pacific, where the then Appellate Division stated that ‘under the common law, the corporate 
personality of a company may be disregarded even if the company had been legitimately 
established and operated but was subsequently misused in a particular instance to perpetrate a 
fraud, or for a dishonest or improper purpose, and that it is not necessary for the company to have 
been ‘conceived and founded in deceit’ before its corporate personality may be disregarded’.229 
This balancing approach laid down by the Appellate Division is modelled on the United States 
case of Glazer v Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, where the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana stated that ‘the policies behind the recognition of a separate corporate existence must be 
balanced against the policies justifying piercing’.230 
The balancing approach requires an evaluation of competing policy consideration in order to 
determine whether or not the veil of incorporation should be pierced. Thus the policies behind 
recognition of a separate corporate existence must be balanced against the policies justifying 
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piercing. In such an approach a court would be entitled to look to substance rather than form to 
arrive at the fact.231 Domanski has also argued that, ‘the concept of separate legal personality must 
be weighed against those principles in favour of piercing the veil’.232 It goes almost without saying 
that the separate juristic personality of the company has always been and remains a cornerstone of 
our company law. South Africa courts, therefore, should apply this test cautiously and with the 
protection of that separate personality as a foremost consideration.  It is evident from the discussed 
cases that the strict application of the separate legal personality would led to unfair results. As 
stated above, courts must exercise caution and wisdom to ensure that they do not develop a 
disproportionate and inappropriate application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in 
South African law.233 
With the enactment of section 20(9) supplementing the concept of veil piercing, one can argue that 
this provision is the answer to the many concerns raised with respect to the common-law rule of 
piercing the corporate veil. However, in light of the uncertainty and confusion which exists in 
relation to the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, what seems to be a codification 
of the common- law rule has also brought many questions and uncertainties which requires 
interpretation in order to determine whether this provision is an improvement of the common law 
rule of veil piercing.  As discussed, the section fails to define the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ and 
to provide any guidance on the circumstances that constitute an ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the 
juristic personality of the company as a separate entity. It is also not clear from a reading of the 
section whether section 20(9) overrides the common law or the judicial instances of piercing the 
corporate veil, or whether piercing of the veil must still be regarded as an exceptional remedy to 
be used only as a last resort, as is the case at common law.234 Moreover, section 20(9) does not 
provide guidance in regard to who would constitute an ‘interested person’ within the scope and 
ambit of the section.235 The question thus arises whether section 20(9) can be seen as an 
improvement on the common law rule of piercing the corporate veil. These issues were first dealt 
with in the recent case of Gore in which the court interpreted section 20(9) for the first time. 
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In the course of its judgment, the court answered some of the questions set out above, and usefully 
set out some important guidelines in regard to the interpretation and application of section 20(9). 
Taking into account all the arguments which have been discussed in this study it can be said that 
the court in Gore adopted a purposive approach coupled with contextualism in an attempt to 
answer some of the questions raised. This afforded the court the opportunity to interpret section 
20(9) as a provision that aimed at developing an uncertain common law rule of veil piercing which 
is characterised as vague and unpredictable. The court further referred to the application of section 
7 of the Companies Act when interpreting a provision in this Act.236 This provision clearly requires 
a teleological approach to be followed when interpreting any provision within the Companies Act, 
it has to be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to the purposes in section 7; one of which is 
to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. According to Van Huyssteen 
this is nothing more than a confirmation of section 39(2) which screams for a value-based 
purposive approach to be followed in the interpretation of the Companies Act.237 In addition, this 
approach allows the courts to apply a wider meaning to the words of the section when so required 
which, in turn, allows them to firstly take into account the history and its short comings and 
secondly, it allows them to adjust the interpretation made to provide for possible changes and 
circumstances in future.238 Simply put, the purposive approach provides for a very adaptable form 
of interpretation in line with the constant change in society. 
On the question of whether section 20(9) has replaced the common law on piercing the corporate 
veil, it was held that there is no express intention to this effect but, equally, no express indication 
that the intention is not to displace the common law. I submit that section 20(9) should not be seen 
as a provision that replaces the common law in it’s entirely but should rather be seen as a 
supplement, developing a rule that for many years has not been applied properly due to its 
vagueness and uncertainty. This was confirmed by Binns-Ward J in his acknowledgement that the 
facts of each case should determine whether the veil should be pierced. This has been the view of 
our courts long before section 20(9) came into existence; thus where the requirements of section 
20(9) are not fulfilled and the section may not be relied upon, the common law remedy of piercing 
the veil would still be applicable. The principles developed at common law with regard to piercing 
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the corporate veil would no doubt serve as useful guidelines for interpreting section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act. In addition, Binns-Ward J also endorsed the common law balancing approach in 
the context of piercing the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9).239 The court stated that in 
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, one must weigh up or balance the importance of 
giving effect to the separate legal personality of a company against the adverse moral and 
economic effects of tolerating an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the 
company.240 The court thus regarded the adverse moral effects of the unconscionable abuse as a 
factor to be taken into consideration in the balancing approach. This clearly shows that section 
20(9) is a mere development, as opposed to replacement of the common law. In regard to the 
meaning of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the juristic personality of a company in section 
20(9), it has been established that the court adopted a very wide interpretation of the words 
‘unconscionable abuse’ and that the term assumes an illegitimate use of a company that affects the 
rights of another. One could argue that the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ implies some form of 
moral consideration. Cassim notes that ‘the wide meaning given to the term ‘unconscionable 
abuse’, make it clear that the legal bases upon which courts have been prepared to pierce the 
corporate veil under the common law have been considerably extended under section 20(9)’.241  
It was also noted that the term ‘interested person’ have been given a wide meaning by Gore, which 
is arguably wider than the meaning given to the similarly worded section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act, where a financial or monetary interest is an essential prerequisite. The court 
stated that no mystique should be attached to the term ‘interested person’ and held that an 
‘interested person’ will be the third party whose rights are affected or a representative depending 
on the legal capacity of such person. Lastly, it was also established that section 20(9) is not a 
remedy of last resort and is not to be regarded as an exceptional remedy, as is arguably the case 
under the common law. This reaffirms the submission that section 20(9) must be seen in light of 
the judgment in Gore as supplementing the common law rather than substituting it, and that 
piercing of the corporate veil is not available only in the absence of an alternative remedy. 
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Based on the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that section 20(9) is a clear improvement of 
the common law rule of veil piercing. This is so because it affords a frim and flexibly defined basis 
for the remedy of veil piercing. However, it is of vital importance for the courts to interpret section 
20(9) in line with approach articulated by Binns-Ward J in Gore and to take a more cautious 
approach towards statutory interpretation in order to maintain clarity and simplicity. One way of 
doing this would be for the courts to maintain and promote simplicity, so as to demystify the 
confusion which exist in the common. In addition, courts must refrain from using metaphors and 
pejorative expressions in their judgment as such expressions may obstruct substance principles 
being formulated, and may thereby cause confusion and uncertainty in the South African Company 
law. So, it can be concluded that the court in Gore has answered the question raised above and set 
out some important principles in regard to the interpretation and application of section 20(9). This 
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